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ABSTRACT 
“Computer scientists prove the existence of God” --- variants of this headline 
appeared in the international press in autumn 2013. Unfortunately, many media 
reports had only moderate success in communicating to the wider public what had 
actually been achieved and what not. This article outlines the main findings of the 
authors’ joint work in computational metaphysics. More precisely, the article 
focuses on their computer-supported analysis of variants and recent emendations 
of Kurt Gödel’s modern ontological argument for the existence of God. In the 
conducted experiments, automated theorem provers discovered some interesting 
and relevant facts. 
1. Introduction  
In autumn 2013, headlines such as “Computer Scientist ‘Prove’ God Exists”, 
“God’s Existence Theorem Is Correct”, “God Is Alive”, etc. appeared in the media, 
first in Germany and Austria, and subsequently in the international press. 
Unfortunately, many of these media reports had only moderate success in 
communicating to the wider public what had actually been achieved and what not.  
This paper provides some more detailed background information (in chronological 
order) on the factual research contributions that triggered these media reports. 
The results presented here were achieved in a close collaboration between the 
two authors. Both were introduced to each other after a presentation Benzmüller 
delivered in October 2012 to the Kurt Gödel Society in Vienna. In this 
presentation, he demonstrated how quantified modal logics (QML) [1][2] and 
other non-classical logics, can be elegantly embedded [3] in classical higher-order 
logic (HOL, Church’s type theory [4][5]). This means that HOL can be used to 
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emulate QML, even though QML comes 
with additional logical connectives which 
are not (directly) available in HOL.1 
Moreover, by employing the embedding 
approach, reasoning tools for HOL 
become readily and effectively applicable 
for reasoning within QML [6][7]. At the end 
of his talk, Benzmüller pointed out that the 
outlined approach should be applicable to formalize and verify Gödel’s modern 
version of the ontological argument [8][9], which is formulated in a higher-order 
QML (cf. Fig.1), with theorem provers for HOL. Benzmüller’s proposal was partly 
inspired by Fitting’s textbook [11], and he had previously attempted some 
formalization along Fitting’s work, but at the time still, without final success. This 
was due not only to insufficient insistence, but also to the comparably ambitious 
and demanding logic settings employed by Fitting.  
 
 
 
Figure. 1. Axioms, definitions and theorems from Gödel’s ontological argument 
for the existence of God [8]; here the variant by Scott [9] is presented. 
                                                
1 Modal logic enriches classical propositional logic with the logical connectives ☐ and  ◊. 
Here, ☐P is to be read as “necessarily P holds”. ◊P in contrast expresses that “P possibly 
holds”. Quantified modal logics additionally support quantification over individuals, 
quantification over propositions and even quantification over relations (sets) and functions.  
 
Higher-oder logic (HOL) 
can emulate quantified 
modal logic (QML) and 
existing theorem provers 
for HOL can be employed 
for reasoning within QML. 
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Woltzenlogel Paleo, a Brazilian logician working in Vienna since 2006, travelled on 
holidays to Brazil in December 2012, and was diagnosed with a life-threatening 
illness soon after his arrival. He needed a lengthy and debilitating treatment, 
during which he and his family was assisted not only by an excellent medical team 
led by Dr. Ana Maria Lobo but also by Priest Edvaldo and his church in 
Piracicaba. In order to thank him for his support, Woltzenlogel Paleo decided to 
present him Gödel’s proof. As he couldn’t find any sufficiently rigorous, complete 
and convincing formalization of Gödel’s proof, he started working on producing 
one on a natural deduction calculus for higher-order modal logics, which he 
created for this purpose. He stored his draft work in an open Github repository 
accessible to anyone interested in contributing and, remembering Benzmüller’s 
talk and interest in this proof, informed him about the repository. 
Initially, Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel Paleo worked largely independent, each 
one following his own approach. However, there was frequent and fruitful 
exchange of information (mainly by email).  
2. Initial Experiments: Scott’s Variant of Gödel’s proof 
In late Spring 2013, two events 
happened independently and almost 
simultaneously: the hand-made 
natural deduction proof was 
completed, after two corrections 
proposed by Annika Siders2; and 
Benzmüller reported success in some 
preliminary experiments on proving 
the lemmas and theorems of the  
Gödel’s proof automatically using the 
embedding approach. From that moment on, both authors tightly joined forces and 
continued the studies together. A major motivation for joining forces was the 
complementarity of both approaches: the hand-made natural deduction proof was 
human-readable, but tedious to check and hence less reliable; the automatic 
proofs were machine-generated and more reliable, but not human-readable. The 
initial focus of the joint efforts was on the embedding approach. Further work on 
                                                
2 Annika Siders became interested in the ontological argument in 2013, when she was 
preparing an introductory course on logic for philosophers and needed a logical argument 
that could show the relevance of formal logic and be of interest to a broad audience. She  
found the open Github repository and this led to her contributions to the natural deduction 
proof. 
First successes: the hand-
made natural deduction proof 
was completed and the HOL 
theorem provers succeeded in 
proving some lemmas and 
theorems of Gödel’s proof 
script fully automatically using 
the embedding approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benzmüller and Paleo / Experiments in comp…. - Gödel’s Proof of God’s Existence 
the hand-made natural deduction proof was delayed, partly because the 
embedding approach proved very fruitful and partly due to a maternity leave of 
Siders. Nevertheless, the two quasi-orthogonal approaches were integrated later, 
when Woltzenlogel Paleo implemented a natural calculus for higher-order QML in 
Coq on top of the embedding approach. And the work on the hand-made natural 
deduction proof was resumed, and completed in 2015. 
The initial series of experiments [12] aimed at thoroughly checking the correctness 
of Gödel’s proof, and precisely identifying the weakest possible assumptions 
under which it holds. The HOL automated theorem proves LEO-II [13] and 
Satallax [14] and the HOL model finder Nitpick [14] were employed. The TPTP 
THF language [16] served as a concrete syntax format for encoding higher-order 
QML in HOL. The THF language is supported as common input syntax by the 
above reasoning tools (and several others). The initial experiments concentrated 
on Scott’s version (cf. Fig.1) of Gödel’s ontological argument. An essential 
difference between Gödel’s and Scott’s versions is that the latter adds a conjunct 
in the definition D2 of essential properties (this will be discussed further below). 
The findings from these experiments on Scott’s variant were manifold (they were 
obtained on a standard MacBook): 
 
i. The axioms (and definitions) are consistent. This was confirmed by 
Nitpick, which presented a simple model within a few seconds. 
ii. Theorem T1 follows from Axioms A1 and A2 in modal logic K (and hence 
also in stronger modal logics such as KB, S4 and S5). 3  This was proved 
by LEO-II and Satallax in a few milliseconds. In fact, the left to right 
direction of the equivalence in A1 is sufficient to prove T1. 
iii. Corollary C follows from T1, D1 and A3, again already in modal logic K. 
This was proved by LEO-II and Satallax in a few milliseconds.  
iv. Theorem T2 follows from A1, D1, A4 and D2 in modal logic K. Again, the 
provers got this result quickly, Satallax within milliseconds and LEO-II 
within 20s.  
v. Theorem T3, necessary existence of a God-like entity, follows from D1, C, 
T2, D3 and A5. Again, this was proved by LEO-II and Satallax in a few 
                                                
3 Modal logic K ist he weakest logic we considered in our experiments. The modal logic 
KB is obtained from K by adding the axiom scheme B: P → ☐◊P, in words, if P holds 
(contingently) then it is necessarily possible that P holds; this axiom scheme corresponds 
to a symmetric accessibility relation in possible world semantics. Obviously, every 
theorem of logic K is also a theorem of logic KB. The opposite is not true: there are 
theorems in logic KB which do not hold in logic K. Logics S4 and S5 add further axiom 
schemes, that is, they are even stronger than logic KB (and K). 
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milliseconds. However, this time modal logic KB was required to obtain 
the result.  KB strengthens modal logic K by postulating the B axiom 
scheme. In modal logic K, theorem T2 does not follow from the axioms 
and definitions. This was confirmed by Nitpick, which reported a counter 
model. 
 
These results were announced in a short abstract uploaded to arXiv in August 
2013.  
The sufficiency of modal logic KB is 
philosophically profound. Our motivation 
to investigate the weakest modal logic 
sufficient for the ontological argument was 
our own perception that the modal logic 
S5 (which is usually assumed for 
ontological proofs) might be too strong, 
because it entails (perhaps counter-
intuitively) that anything that is possibly 
necessary is necessary, ◊☐P → ☐P. 
Later, we found out that the sufficiency of KB had already been conjectured by 
Anderson [17] and acknowledged by Sobel [18], but no formal proof had ever 
been presented. Soon after the automatic proof using only KB was found, Annika 
Siders submitted an improvement of the hand-made natural deduction proof that 
relied only on KB. 
A few weeks later, the following two additional results were obtained and 
presented on the 1st of November 2013 at Freie Universität Berlin, in the first joint 
talk of Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel Paleo. 
 
vi. The God-like entity, whose existence was proved in Step (5), is flawless in 
the sense that it may only exemplify positive properties. The provers got 
this quickly (in modal logic KB) from A1 and D1; Satallax within 
milliseconds and LEO-II within 20s.  
vii. Moreover, this God-like entity is unique, i.e. monotheism is a 
consequence of Gödel’s theory. Satallax proved this in milliseconds from 
D1 and flawlessness of God. 
 
In philosophical pen and paper proofs, assumptions about the logical foundations 
are often not made explicit. This has also been the case for Gödel’s proof script. In 
computer formalizations, however, the detailed settings of the employed logic 
Findings: The theorem 
provers found out that the 
comparatively weak logic 
KB is sufficient to prove the 
final result, that is, 
necessary existence of 
God. This contribution is 
philosophically profound.” 
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have to be explicitly provided and concrete choices cannot be avoided. That is, 
the very logic settings become fully transparent. The results reported above were 
achieved in a setting with full comprehension (which is inherited in the embedding 
approach from the HOL meta-logic), rigid terms and ‘possibilist’ (constant domain) 
quantification over individuals.  
In a second series of experiments, the 
encoding of the quantifiers for individuals has 
been varied to capture also ‘actualist’ (varying 
domain) quantification. All our previous results 
remained valid with this modification as well. 
Together, the embedding approach and all 
experimental results mentioned up to this point (and those from Sections 3 and 4 
below) were presented in detail at the European Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence in 2014 [19].  
Automated theorem provers sometimes find 
interesting alternative proofs. This apparently 
was also the case in our experiments. By 
analyzing the proofs, one can see, for example, 
that the property of being self-identical, which is 
mentioned in Gödel’s manuscript and in Scott’s 
notes, can be avoided. In this particular case, however, the finding was not 
entirely new. The natural deduction proof of Theorem 1, constructed 
independently by Woltzenlogel Paleo, also did not use self-identity. Moreover, the 
possibility of a proof not relying on self-identity had already been pointed out by an 
anonymous referee to Anderson [17]. 
3. Possible and Necessary Truths and the Modal Collapse 
Anselm’s ontological argument [10] 
does not properly differentiate 
between contingent, possible and 
necessary truths. In contrast, Gödel 
formalized his proof in a modal 
(higher-order) logic, which supports 
such discrimination. For example, 
Gödel’s corollary C (cf. Fig.1) 
proves from preceding assumptions 
that it is possible for God to exist. 
Advantage: In computer 
formalizations the very 
logic settings become 
fully transparent.  
 Interesting alternative 
proofs were found by 
the theorem provers. 
Finding: Gödel’s axioms and 
definitions are so powerful that 
they imply what is known as the 
modal collapse: contingent truth 
implies necessary truth, or in 
formal notation: P → ☐P. The 
HOL provers were able to 
confirm this. 
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Corollary C is then used further to prove T3, that necessarily God exists. This 
discrimination of possible and necessary truths via modal operators enabled 
Gödel to address a relevant critique, studied by Leibniz, about St. Anselm’s 
original work on the ontological argument: Anselm’s argument assumes that it is 
possible for a God-like being to exist, and without this assumption the argument 
fails. At first sight, it thus appears that Gödel’s argument very convincingly 
addresses these (and other) issues. However, as Sobel [18][10] showed, Gödel’s 
axioms and definitions are so powerful that they imply what is known as the modal 
collapse: contingent truth implies necessary truth, or in formal notation: P → ☐P. 
From this, we also get that possible truth implies necessary truth and vice versa. 
In other words, there are no unnecessary contingent truths. One may even see 
modal collapse as a result against free will. 
The theorem provers were in fact able to confirm the modal collapse within a few 
seconds. Moreover, the provers also showed that the result is independent of 
using possibilist or actualist quantifiers (for individuals). 
What does this mean for Gödel’s ontological argument? Is it doomed to fail? Well, 
not necessarily. On the one hand, the modal collapse, being derivable from the 
assumptions of the ontological argument, may actually serve those philosophical 
views well which support forms of determinism. Kovác [20] goes as far to argue 
that modal collapse may actually conform with Gödel‘s own philosophical 
viewpoints. On the other hand, modal collapse has recently incited several 
philosophers to develop emendations of Gödel’s argument in order to remedy the 
situation.  
In collaboration with Leon Weber, we have meanwhile extended our computer-
supported analysis to several of these emendations [21]. The findings of these 
more recent studied will be addressed in Sec. 5 below. 
4. A Subtle Difference in the Notion of Essence 
The above results apply to Scott’s variant [9] of Gödel’s proof which slightly differs 
from the version that was found in Gödel’s Nachlass’ [8]. One difference is to be 
found in the notion of essence. In Scott’s version, “an essence of an individual is a 
property possessed by it and necessarily implying any of its properties”. For 
Gödel, in contrast, “an essence of an individual is a property that is necessarily 
implying any of its properties”. Gödel omits the conjunct “possessed by it”. So 
what happens if this conjunct in the definition of D2 (cf. Fig.1) is left out? 
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To study the consequences, we have 
replayed the experiments as reported 
above, but this time for the varied 
definition D2. Interestingly, the model 
finder Nitpick failed to report a model. To 
assess the situation, we subsequently 
tried to use the HOL theorem provers to 
prove the inconsistency of the modified 
set of axioms and definitions. To our surprise, the prover LEO-II indeed 
succeeded (in about 30 seconds) in doing so. We have both not been aware of 
this inconsistency. In fact, related comments in philosophy papers often classify 
Scott’s modification only as a ‘cosmetic’ change to what is often addressed as a 
minor oversight by Gödel. So what causes this inconsistency and how is the 
argument working? Unfortunately, the technical, machine-oriented proof object 
that was returned by LEO-II has been so inaccessible that even Benzmüller, the 
developer of the tool, failed for a long time to extract a persuasive human-level 
argument from it. 
5. Repeating the Experiments in Isabelle/HOL and Coq 
The automated theorem provers LEO-II and Satallax do not offer small and trusted 
kernels on which the correctness of their proofs can rest assured. Moreover, their 
low-level, machine-oriented proof calculi are making it particularly hard for humans 
to follow the very technical chain of proof steps they report. Though their 
background theory is sound, their actual reasoning could be flawed due to 
potential, yet undetected bugs in their implementations. 
To address this issue and to add another 
layer of trust to our results, we therefore 
decided to repeat and verify all previous 
experiments by using the prominent proof 
assistants Isabelle/HOL [22] and Coq [23] 
which do provide a smaller trusted kernel. 
Isabelle/HOL, in particular, provides strong 
internal proof automation facilities, and it integrates (or links to) external 
automated theorem provers, including LEO-II and Satallax. Moreover, means to 
reconstruct external proofs within Isabelle/HOL’s highly trusted kernel have been 
developed in recent years [24][25]. By using these facilities, we quickly 
succeeded in replaying the experiments within Isabelle/HOL, which reassured our 
Finding: The theorem 
prover LEO-II showed that 
the axioms and definitions 
in Gödel’s original proof 
script are inconsistent. This 
result was new to us. 
Our experiments were 
repeated with the highly 
trustful proof assistants 
Isabelle/HOL and Coq. 
This provided additional 
assurance. 
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previous findings [26]. Unfortunately, however, automatic proof reconstruction in 
Isabelle/HOL failed for one of the reported results, namely LEO-II’s inconsistency 
result discussed above.  
In addition to Isabelle/HOL, we also replayed the experiments in the Coq proof 
assistant. However, the main motivation now was to demonstrate that the 
embedding approach not only serves proof automation well but also enables user 
interaction. Woltzenlogel Paleo quickly succeeded in reconstructing the findings 
interactively within Coq. As part of this work, we also demonstrated how a direct 
natural deduction calculus [27] for higher-modal logic can be implemented within 
the embedding approach as tactics in Coq [28]. This offers interesting 
perspectives for future work to integrate proof search in the direct and embedding 
approaches. 
6. Further Experiments: Emendations of Gödel’s Proof 
The success of the experiments, 
particularly the observed nearly 
perfect match between the 
argumentation granularity in Gödel’s 
ontological argument and the proof 
automation capabilities of the HOL 
provers in the embedding approach 
was by no means expected. A very 
relevant question thus came up, 
namely whether the approach would scale also for the verification of other 
research papers in this area. We, therefore, decided to look at more recent 
emendations on the ontological argument attempting to remedy the modal 
collapse. The correctness of the emendations and of several meta-remarks about 
them is much more controversial, and this served as an additional motivation for 
the use of a computer-assisted approach. 
Hájek [29][30] proposed in his emendation the use of cautious instead of full 
comprehension principles, and Fitting [11] took greater care of the semantics of 
higher-order quantifiers in the presence of modalities. That is, both authors 
suggested to change the specific logic settings. Others, such as Anderson [17], 
Hájek [31] and Bjørdal [32], proposed emendations of Gödel's axioms and 
definitions. They require neither comprehension restrictions nor more complex 
semantics. Therefore, they are technically simpler to analyze within the 
embedding approach. 
Finding: We observed a nearly 
perfect match between the 
argumentation granularity in 
the papers on Gödel’s 
ontological argument and the 
proof automation capabilities 
of the HOL provers. 
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We have formalized and studied those using Isabelle/HOL in combination with the 
automated HOL reasoners. The approach again performed very well. Like in the 
previous experiments, the HOL reasoners quickly responded to the formalized 
argumentation steps, either by automatically confirming them as valid, or by 
refuting them, in which case counter models were presented.  
Interestingly, the HOL provers not only 
confirmed many claimed results, but also 
exposed a few mistakes and produced novel 
insights. In particular, the provers were able 
to settle a long standing debate on the 
redundancy of axioms A4 and A5 in different 
settings that was going on among between 
Magari, Anderson and Hájek; we presented   
these results at the First World Congress on 
Logic and Religion [21]. 
These additional experiments strikingly demonstrate the potential benefits of a 
computational metaphysics as exemplified here in which humans and computer 
programs join forces in order to settle philosophical disputes. This pretty much 
matches Leibniz vision known as “Calculemus!”. 
7. Leo-II’s Inconsistency Proof 
Inspired by a discussion of the inconsistency issue with Chad Brown, Benzmüller 
recently succeeded in reconstructing and verifying LEO-II’s argument by hand 
within Isabelle/HOL. Once revealed and understood, the argument is in fact 
surprisingly comprehensible: 
a. The argument starts from axiom A1 (“Either a property or its negation is 
positive, but not both”) and axiom A2 (“A property necessarily implied by a 
positive property is positive”). These two assumptions imply theorem T1 
(“Positive properties are possibly exemplified”), as we already know. 
b. Now take the modified definition of D2 (“An essence of an individual is a 
property that is necessarily implying any of its properties”) and consider 
the empty property, or alternatively the property of being self-different, as 
a candidate. Then Lemma 1 is derivable: “The empty property (or self-
difference) is an essence of every entity”. 
c. From the definition of necessary existence (“Necessary existence of an 
individual is the necessary exemplification of all its essences”), modal 
Finding: The HOL 
theorem provers were 
even able to settle a long 
standing debate between 
two philosophers.  
This pretty much 
matches Leibniz vision 
known as “Calculemus!” 
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axiom B and Lemma 1 follows Lemma 2: “Exemplification of necessary 
existence is not possible”. 
d. Axiom A5 “Necessary existence is a positive property”, theorem T1 and 
Lemma 2 now imply falsehood. 
 
LEO-II’s proof object actually contains the 
crucial property instantiation performed in Step 
b. However, this key step gets lost in the 
technical noise of the proof. It is important to 
remark that this instantiation has not been 
synthesized by LEO-II, for example, by 
employing higher-order (pre-)unification. 
Instead, it has been guessed during proof 
search using the blindly guessing primitive substitution rule. As experts know, this 
rule unfortunately cannot be fully abandoned in HOL automated theorem proving 
(without loosing Henkin-completeness) [5]. This point to an interesting aspect: 
attempts to repeat this successful inconsistency proof of LEO-II with first-order 
theorem provers will likely be doomed to fail, since the only source to come up 
with this crucial instantiation of the empty property (or self-difference) appears to 
be the comprehension schemes of set theory. 
8. Discussion  
Ontological arguments in the tradition of 
Anselm’s, since their first revelation, have 
fascinated generations of philosophers. In fact, 
they usually trigger strong reactions, against or 
in favor of them. In philosophical circles, the 
debate is not yet settled and the allurement of 
ontological arguments seems far from fading. 
Readers of the public media reports that were 
triggered by our work, however, overwhelmingly seem to reject them. This 
becomes apparent from hundreds of blog entries and comments linked at the 
respective media websites. Such blog entries and comments have recently been 
statistically analysed by Fuhrmann [33]. Clearly, without a certain level of 
education in metaphysics, modern logic and the axiomatic method, Gödel’s modal 
ontological argument, appears largely inaccessible. This may provide some level 
of explanation. Generally, a certain amount of philosophical education seems 
required for not being irritated by the ontological argument in the first place. 
Readers of the public 
media reports that 
were triggered by our 
work overwhelmingly 
seem to reject the 
ontological argument. 
LEO-II’s inconsistency 
result on Gödel’s 
original proof script has 
meanwhile been 
reconstructed and 
verified in Isabelle/HOL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benzmüller and Paleo / Experiments in comp…. - Gödel’s Proof of God’s Existence 
However, the media writers are also to be blamed, because of their apparent 
interest in creating ‘headline stories’, and in copying, nitpicking and obfuscating 
text passages from each other instead of presenting unbiased, properly 
investigated and individually prepared information.  For example, in an early 
interview on the topic to the German edition of Spiegel Online, Benzmüller 
mentioned that ‘the initial experiments were conducted on his MacBook’. While 
this has been true, he should have better used the neutral term ‘notebook’, since 
the experiments can (and have been) repeated also with other computer 
technology. The original Spiegel Online article mentioned ‘MacBook’, however, it 
did not prominently overemphasize this point (and a good technology writer could 
have clarified the independence of the experimental results from the hardware 
anyway). However, when the news subsequently made its way to the US, some 
intentionally (and very naively) obfuscated headlines appeared such as 
“Researchers say they used MacBook to prove Gödel’s God theorem” or “God 
exists, say Apple fanboy scientists”. Such headline stories were written even by 
‘award winning creative directors’ such as Chris Matyszczyk, who in fact never 
talked to us directly. One may argue, therefore, that these articles say a lot more 
about media quality and media standards in the US than about the quality of the 
actual research content they address. And it is little surprise that such intentionally 
obfuscated and jaundiced media reports trigger negative attitudes of bloggers 
towards the ontological argument.  
Finally, we think that philosophical tradition has to be blamed to a certain extent, 
due to the low availability of authoritative texts trying to appropriately communicate 
the ontological argument to a wider audience. Both of us (we have begun our 
studies on the topic only recently) have experienced that a large proportion of the 
existing texts are targeting a rather exclusive circle of readers sharing a significant 
background expertise, in particular, on the detailed historical development in the 
area. This in turn excludes, and presumably negatively affects, those readers not 
willing to clear their backlog before commenting on the topic. It seems that other 
academic disciplines have in fact achieved a higher level of historical and 
contextual independence in their modern literature. (But maybe this is not really a 
worthwhile option for philosophy?) 
But what is now our position on the ontological 
argument? Well, we both share the opinion with 
proponents of Gödel’s work that prominent 
objections to his proof, including Gaunilo-like 
repectively Oppy-like parodies, are currently not 
on a par with Gödel’s work, and its recent 
Belief in a (God-like) 
supreme being is not 
trivially irrational. 
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emendations with respect to technical precision and persuasive power. 
Investigating and eventually either confirming their correctness or unveiling flaws 
in them, with the assistance of our technology, remains an exciting direction for 
future work. Moreover, there clearly are theologically and metaphysically relevant 
objections, including the modal collapse, which are not yet fully settled. However, 
as a conclusion one may say that the ontological argument succeeds at least in 
the following sense: it shows that belief in a (God-like) supreme being is not 
trivially irrational. There are consistent axiomatizations that non-trivially entail the 
necessary existence of a God-like being. As for any axiomatization, and not only 
those with a religious theme, it often remains a ’matter of faith’ to believe in the 
truth of the proposed axioms in the actual universe. 
Our core contribution is a technological approach and machinery that, as has 
been well demonstrated here, can fruitfully support further logical investigations in 
this area. This machinery may eventually even be helpful for settling some of the 
open questions. In particular, our technology seems ready to be used with the aim 
of minimizing logic related causes of defect in this area. As an expedient, this 
machinery should (at least in the long run) be able to significantly ease the 
technically involved practical work in metaphysics. 
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